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The unhealthy tendency that today requires constitutional correction
is the distortion of government and the demotion of Congress in the
regime. That distortion and that demotion have been produced by
legislative careerism predicated on constant abuse of the power of the
purse.'
These sentences are as good as any to introduce the main themes of
George F. Will's rambling and untidy argument in favor of congressional term
limitations. Unlike many advocates of term limitations,2 Will portrays himself
as a friend of Congress, and his argument contains at least the rudiments of a
causal theory. Legislative careerism is held to be the cause of a number of
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things that are wrong with Congress and that weaken the influence of Congress
in the political system. Term limits are introduced as the cure that will
strengthen Congress by abolishing legislative careerism.
An unusual feature of Will's argument is his eagerness to part company
with a fair number of advocates of term limitations on various points that
heretofore have been regarded as salient. For example, he professes
indifference to the larger partisan or policy consequences of term limitations
beyond an allegedly salutary effect on the pork barrel. Advocates frequently
take the view that congressional term limits will help Republicans, since more
Democrats are currently entrenched in Congress, and conservatives, because
the longer members stay the more likely they are to vote for appropriations for
governmental functions.3 Will also refuses to praise legislative amateurism as
a proper or relevant goal that term limits can achieve.4
Will enumerates a longish list of complaints about Congress and its
operations that nobody heretofore has had the ingenuity to link with a lack of
term limits. And for good reason; Will's case with respect to each is quite
weak. He is annoyed, for example, with the redrawing of congressional district
boundaries to create majorities for minority voters. These districts, Will says,
"represent a new dimension of Washington arrogance and bipartisan cynicism
in the service of incumbents." 5 In fact, redistricting is generally handled in the
several states by state legislatures, and not in Washington at all. Members of
Congress can only seek to influence the process indirectly. Redistricting has
unseated incumbents in several cases, and threatened incumbents in many
others.6
There are at least four other similar loose ends in Will's argument:
(1) Will rightly observes that the operations of the legislative schedule make
normal family life difficult for members of Congress. How will term limits
help current members overcome this problem? Evidently by separating
members from Congress, and hence from operations of the legislative
schedule.7 Will does not show how, if term limits were adopted, the same
problem would not plague members who succeed the current crop. (2) Will
notes that incumbent members use franked mail heavily, especially to help get
reelected.8 Term limits would solve this problem, he argues, by decreasing the
number of incumbents running at each election. (3) "Term limitation," says
Will, "would also help to reinvigorate our understanding of citizenship by
1
3. See JAMES L. PAYNE, THE CULTURE OF SPENDING 175-81 (1991) (advocating term limits as a
means of limiting government expenditures).
4. Pp. 140-42.
5. P. 48.
6. For example, in 1992, Steven Solarz in New York, Ben Erdreich in Alabama, and Robin Tallon in
South Carolina were unseated by redistricting. For a general overview, see Bob Benenson, Arduous Ritual
of Redistricting Ensures More Racial Diversity, CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., October 24, 1992, at 3355-3413.
7. Pp. 50-53.
8. Pp. 93-96.
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reemphasizing the value of civic participation." 9 He suggests that this would
be accomplished because long-term legislators monopolize public office, a
form of civic participation, for long periods of time; but short-term legislators
would not.'" (4) Finally, Will argues that:
The rise of the career legislator is another reason for the rise of
judicial activism in a climate of rights talk. This is so because
legislative careerism begets in legislators an unsavory prudence, which
in turn begets the impulse to solve society's problems by judicial fiats
rather than political deliberation. Therefore term limits for legislators
would help to limit the imperial judiciary."
These arguments make for difficult reading because their relevance to term
limits is hard to fathom, or because Will's facts are wrong, or because Will
thinks getting rid of incumbents will get rid of problems that hang around
Capitol Hill regardless of how long incumbents serve.
The core of Will's argument lies elsewhere, and can conveniently be
examined by considering three questions to which he returns affirmative
answers:
1. Will term limits improve congressional deliberation?
2. Will term limits reduce congressional interest in seizing local
advantage?
3. Will term limits increase the power of Congress in the political
system?
I. DELIBERATION
Will defines deliberation, in the abstract, as "a disposition to reason about
policies on their merits."' 2 He describes it as an attribute of individual
members' thought and judgment, as whatever it was that Burke recommended
to the electors of Bristol, and as not merely obtaining goodies for the home
folks.' 3 Will contrasts deliberation with ratification.' 4 He traces it to its
linguistic root in Greek as "to weigh."' 5 One member of Congress (Charles
Vanik, D., Ohio) is called to witness that members have no time to do it.' 6
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[I]s one in which members reason together about the problems
confronting the community and strive to promote policies in the
general interest of the community. The deliberative process involves
identification and investigation of social needs, the evaluation of
programs currently attempting to meet these needs, and the
formulation of new legislative remedies for recalcitrant problems. On
the surface, Congress seems to be in the business of informing and
persuading-the essence of a deliberative process.'7
According to Will, however, this is not what Congress is actually doing: it is
engaging in "mere posturing in the service of careerism." 8
How can Will possibly know this? Even if it were to be the case-which
no careful observer of Congress could possibly concede-that each and every
participant in each and every congressional transaction-committee hearings,
mark ups of legislation, floor debates, conferences-was personally motivated
by nothing but career concerns, venality, selfishness, and/or other base motives,
it still would not follow that the collective result would discourage
deliberation. Ever since 1776, when Adam Smith described how a market
supplying goods useful to the community might arise from the self-interested
behavior of many actors, social observers have had to confront the possibility
of a gap between individual motives and collective outcomes.' 9 Not even a
good case about individuals and their motives can exempt an author from a
serious look at the institution and its workings.
But Will's case about individuals is not especially good; he delves only
anecdotally into individual actions, some horrible, some trivial, invariably
assigning base motives.2' As to the absence of deliberation from the actual
collective work of Congress, some of which any of us can observe on C-
SPAN, he makes no case at all.2' And so we must ask: Does Congress, as
17. Pp. 110-11.
18. P. 111.
19. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 119
(Penguin Books 1986) (1776) ("[I]t is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer or the baker that
we expect our dinner, but from their regard for their own interest. We address ourselves not to their
humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but of their advantages.").
20. For instance, he describes Rep. Newt Gingrich (R., Ga.) campaigning in Georgia and promising
to "do more for Cobb County," including giving up the chauffered automobile to which he was entitled
as Republican Whip. Pp. 97-99. Or Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D., Colo.) seeking and getting a $3 million
appropriation to subsidize midnight basketball leagues for at-risk urban youth. Pp. 33-34. From this latter
example, Will concludes that Rep. Schroeder has become "deranged" by her presence in Washington since
1972. P. 34.
21. Here is one possible exception. Will says: 'To those who dismiss such examples [as midnight
basketball] as 'merely anecdotal' a proper response is that a sufficiency of anecdotes makes a pattern that
confirms a theory. The pattern, in this case, is the federal budget ..." P. 141. Needless to say, Will's book
is not about the federal budget's contents, the budgetary process, or-what he seems to advocate
here-zero-based budgeting. There are such books. See, e.g., JOHN GILMOUR, RECONCILABLE
DIFFERENCES?: CONGRESS, THE BUDGET PROCESS, AND THE DEFICIT (1990); ALAN SCHICK, CONGRESS AND
MONEY: BUDGETING, SPENDING, AND TAXING (1980); AARON WILDAVSKY, THE POLITICS OF THE
BUDGETARY PROCESS (4th ed. 1984); A ZERO-BASED LOOK AT ZERO-BASED BUDGETING: WHY ITS
FAILURES IN STATE GOVERNMENT ARE BEING DUPLICATED IN WASHINGTON (Thomas H. Hammond &
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currently constructed, deliberate? If we can think of deliberation as the
introduction and consideration of alternative courses of action, as the
comparison of these alternatives one against another, as the marshalling of
reasons for preferring various alternatives, and as the resolution of
disagreements about alternatives by some systematic means, such as voting,
then Congress, as an organization, can be observed deliberating as a prominent
feature of its corporate activity. Deliberation is what committees do when they
mark up bills.22 It is what individual members ask of their colleagues when
they introduce bills and seek hearings on them. It is what happens at hearings
as witnesses are invited to state their case for and against the provisions of a
measure under consideration. It is what members are contributing to when they
consult one another on the substance of legislation, when they seek the
guidance of committee staff, when they make speeches on the floors of their
respective houses, and when they engage in colloquy with one another.'
C-SPAN viewers can also observe that not all such colloquies are brilliant
or edifying, and not all members take the lead on every issue. But neither of
these conditions-workaday averageness in levels of rhetorical performance
and a strong propensity to divide labor-can conceal the plain fact that
Congress as an organizational entity does its work by deliberating.
Even if we were to take the dim view of congressional deliberation
proposed by Will, how would congressional deliberative work be improved by
limiting the terms of members? Since Will does not discuss very much of the
actual work of Congress directly, he makes no case that directly addresses this
question. I suppose we could imagine that the continuous infusion of new
members might be good for the fresh consideration of issues that are
perennially on the congressional agenda and might promote the raising of new
issues. But even without term limitations, normal electoral and actuarial
processes operating on Congress produce a 10% to 25% turnover every two
years.24 Term limits are only one method-and a rather clumsy method-of
introducing new perspectives into Congress.
The clumsiness of term limits arises by virtue of the fact that, in any
organization, old hands have virtues complementary to those of new. Knowing
where the bodies are buried in a large and confusing bureaucracy, familiarity
Jack H. Knott eds., 1980. These books do not confirm Will's implied claims that the budget consists mostly
of pork, or predominantly reflects congressional careerism. It is true, however, that the federal budget is
not annually deliberated over in full. Because of its size and complexity, institutionally defensible
economizing devices are necessary, and they are used both in the executive branch and in Congress.
22. There are not many. Here is one: CLEM MILLER, MEMBER OF THE HOUSE 13-15 (John W. Baker
ed., 1962). A classic careful description of a bill becoming a law is STEPHEN K. BAILEY, CONGRESS MAKES
A LAW (1950). More recent examples are RICHARD E. COHEN, WASHINGTON AT WORK: BACK ROOMS
AND CLEAN AIR (1992); and PAUL C. LIGHT, FORGING LEGISLATION (1992).
23. See MILLER, supra note 22, at 33-41.
24. NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN sT AL., VITAL STATISTICS ON CONGRESS, 1991-1992 at 58 (1992). The last
line in the table gives turnover in the House excluding deaths from 1946 (24.6% not reelected) to 1990
(10.3% not reelected).
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with the arguments of lobbyists, technical expertise, and experience at making
judgments in a well-publicized legislative arena are all factors that may
contribute to the wisdom of the collective product.25 Term limits arbitrarily
deprive Congress, and the nation, of these contributions. It thus seems doubtful
that term limits will improve congressional deliberation.
II. THE PORK BARREL
The bulk of Will's complaints about current congressional operations have
to do not with deliberation at all, but with what he sees as a poisonous
relationship between members of Congress and interest groups leading to
outrageous grabs at the public purse. If at short intervals we were to send
members home and replace them, he reasons, this cozy relationship would not
grow up. Members would deliberate instead of grab.
"If people served in legislatures only briefly," he says, "going to them
from other careers, to which they would return in a few years, they would
have less incentive to shovel out pork., 26 "Of course," he says, "'everybody
does it.' Always have, always will, to some degree. But surely senators would
do it less if they were limited to, say, two terms. In six of their twelve years
they might think of something-the national interest, perhaps-other than
buying votes with the voters' money."'27
The logic underlying this argument seems to me hopelessly muddled. It is
tenable only if predicated on the assumption that all congressmen retreat to a
life of idleness at the end of their terms. If, on the other hand, members knew
that after a term of service in Congress they would have to do something to
make a living, and provide for their families, their relations of dependency
toward interest groups, or other outside influences, would increase sharply.
Indeed, with a future outside of Congress near at hand, anticipations of future
need might well impinge upon their performance as public servants to a degree
currently unheard of.
This seems to me true whether departing members go home or stay in
Washington (working, for example, in Washington law firms). Why would a
prescribed, limited time in office diminish members' incentives to help the
constituents back home among whom they would soon be living? For members
who stay in Washington, as so many departing members now do, limited
25. See JOHN R. HIBBING, CONGRESSIONAL CAREERS 177-181 (1991). Hibbing concludes in his
systematic study of legislative careers:
[R]equiring representatives to leave after a set number of years would likely result in a
devastating loss of legislative acumen, expertise, and activity.... [lincreasing tenure is strongly
and positively related to legislative activity as well as to legislative specialization and efficiency.
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service would sharpen the incentives to make deals that might have some
reciprocal payoff in their new lives.
I daresay that many members, being decent public servants, would have
no difficulty ignoring these incentives, as many members do today. Today,
however, an honorable career in congressional service is among the well-
settled rewards for good behavior. Will acknowledges the possibility of such
careers in the dedication of his book to two public-spirited senators, John
Danforth and Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Has he noticed public officials of like
probity in the House of Representatives? They exist.2"
In a single sentence, Will rejects this construction of reality. It flies in the
face, he says, of the alleged fact that lobbyists "are passionate opponents of
term limits because they have valuable investments in long-term relationships
of mutual aggrandizement with career legislators. 2 9
Whether or not all or many or a few lobbyists see their short-run interests
as Will casually reports seems to me not wholly dispositive of the underlying
issue, which is this: on the whole, do lobbyists have more influence on
experienced legislators or inexperienced legislators? Even if it were the case
that lobbyists are lazy and prefer to do business with old allies, an independent
look at the question might lead us to conclude that rapid turnover in a
legislature gives more power to lobbyists. I have mentioned one set of
circumstances in which this might occur: term limitations would put at risk the
independence of legislators contemplating exit who, rather than returning
Cincinnatus-like to their waiting plow, prefer some sort of future elsewhere.
Even Cincinnatus might be tempted to send a farm subsidy or two homeward
in advance of his return. None of this seems to me far-fetched; term limitations
are already adversely affecting the independence of the recently term-limited
California State Legislature.3" In modem society, not many jobs wait for
legislators to return to them after six or eight or twelve years in politics.3 So
long as retiring legislators are not taken out behind the barn and shot, they will
have to think about their futures.
28. See RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., WATCHING POLITICIANS: ESSAYS ON PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 95-
111 (1990); DAVID E. PRICE, THE CONGRESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (1992).
29. P. 57.
30. The New York 77mes for Friday, August 28, 1992 reports as follows:
The [budget] settlement that is emerging reflects the fiendishly complex world of California politics:
the Governor and the Democratic Speaker of the State Assembly ... are like two scorpions in a
bottle; the 250,000-member California Teachers Association holds enormous political power.., and
the powerful Democratic President pro tern of the State Senate, David A. Roberti of Los Angeles,
seems to want Governor Wilson to make him a judge when term limits force him to retire in two
years.
Robert Reinhold, After Two Month Standoff, California Appears on Verge of Passing a Budget Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 28, 1992, at A12.
31. Such jobs may, however, belong disproportionately to Republicans. I deduce this from the arresting
argument of Alan Ehrenhalt in his book, THE UNITED STATES OF AMBITION (1991). We might imagine that
term-limited Republicans, therefore, would be more likely as members to feather their nests at home,
whereas Democrats would make deals with Washington interest groups. I do not see much to choose
between these possible outcomes.
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Exit is only one point, and perhaps not even the most significant point, at
which interest groups gain an advantage over legislators as the result of term
limits. Consider the problem that candidates for Congress might have in
assembling resources to run for office in the first place. Even those
congressional districts that are not especially competitive between the parties
require some campaigning and some advertising. A safe open seat may well
attract several candidates and hence force competition at the level of the
primary. Where would the resources to conduct these elections come from if
not from interest groups?
It may be argued (though it is not by Will) that entrance via the normal
nomination processes is the prerogative of political parties and that term limits,
over the long run, would therefore strengthen parties in the electorate. This is
a dubious proposition at best since, in most constituencies, it is interest groups
and not parties that hold most of the resources. On the whole, members of
Congress today are not nominated by strong local parties but by processes of
entrepreneurship in which candidates put themselves forward and gather up
resources as best they can. Party endorsements may well help. But in most
constituencies, they are not decisive.32
It is not uncommon to see veteran members of Congress build up
substantial war chests to discourage electoral competition, and interest groups
most assuredly contribute to these. It is quite right therefore to observe that
well-entrenched members maintain alliances with interest groups. A casual
inspection of Federal Election Commission print-outs shows that interest
groups having business before the committees on which Members of Congress
sit are prominent among the contributors to their campaigns. This points to the
possibility that as time goes on interest groups become more dependent upon
legislators than the other way around.
A distinction may be drawn between interest groups operating exclusively
at the district level, which presumably would predominate in helping new
legislators get elected in the first place, and nationally organized interest
groups which tend to be the lobbyists feeding the coffers of non-term-limited
legislative veterans. Are local interests good guys and national interests bad
guys? This is shaky as a general proposition, I think. Readers can make up
their own horrible examples. Here is one: in 1964, White Citizens' Councils
32. The most germane scholarly work on this question is LOUIS SANDY MAISEL, FROM OBSCURITY
TO OBLIVION: RUNNING IN THE CONGRESSIONAL PRIMARY (1982). See also the encyclopedic accounts of
members of Congress and their districts in MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF
AMERICAN POLITICS 1992 (1991), and CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S POLITICS IN AM, ERICA 1992 (Phil
Duncan ed., 1991). In Costa Rica, where parties are strong and terms are limited, constituency service and
what the author, Michelle Taylor, calls "delivering pork" are given a very high priority by sitting
legislators. Michelle M. Taylor, Formal Versus Informal Incentive Structures and Legislative Behavior:
Evidence from Costa Rica, 54 J. POL. 1055 (1992). This result is roughly the opposite of the behavior
predicted by Will, and is consistent with my argument. "So we learn," Taylor concludes, "that a career
incentive does dominate the behavior of legislators even when they cannot be reelected." Id. at 1072.
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(local) played an active part in defeating Alabama Representative Carl Elliott,
principal sponsor in the House of the National Defense Education Act
(national).33
The issue here is not whether members of Congress are going to have
relationships at all with interest groups, but rather under what conditions
interest groups will be relatively powerful vis-a-vis members. The argument
I am pressing simply says that the newer the member, the more dependent he
or she is on the interest groups that helped elect him or her in the first place.
The more Congress consists of new members, the more dependent Congress
is upon interest groups that helped the members get elected.
So entrance to and exit from Congress are two points at which members
are especially vulnerable to interest group influence; therefore, the more
entering and exiting, the more outside influence. Term limits are intended to
promote more entering and exiting, and therefore, if this analysis is correct,
would worsen the very conditions of which Will complains.
I. CONGRESS IN THE POLITICAL SYSTEM
Entrance and exit do not exhaust the points at which interest groups might
gain unusual influence. Far more significant than either of these is the process
of lawmaking itself. Members of Congress gain most of their influence on
public policy, and most of their competence in exercising that influence, by
attending to their committee work over a sufficiently long period of time that
the issues and the interests before their committees become familiar to them.
It should come as no surprise at all that experience on the job helps liberals
and conservatives alike to do their jobs better.34 Not all members of Congress
have the desire or the ability to become subject matter experts, and significant
players in the making of national policy. But some do, and they make
important contributions. The perspectives they bring frequently differ from
those of bureaucrats and political appointees in the executive branch. The
capacity of Congress as an institution to render judgments independent of
undue interest group or executive branch influence resides largely in the work
of these expert members. Term limits, I fear, is a proposal to wipe that
influence out. They seem to me on this account alone to be extremely short-
sighted.
33. CARL ELLIoTr, SR. & MICHAEL D'ORSO, THE COST OF COURAGE: THE JOURNEY OF AN
AMERICAN CONGRESSMAN 177, 241-58, 261 (1992); see Pub. L. No. 88-665, 78 Stat. 1100 (1964).
34. See RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., THE MAKING OF A SENATOR: DAN QUAYLE (1989) (portraying the
role of personal growth and the usefulness of experience in the legislative career of Dan Quayle); HIBBING,
supra note 25, at 178-80.
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Will scoffs at this concern." There is, after all, no magic number of years
before experience begins to matter in a member's deliberations. For many
members, no amount of sitting there and listening to the testimony of the same
old lobbyists year after year will make any difference. Expertise acquired by
other means will come to be valued more. And so on. All of these propositions
seem to me to be true, but largely irrelevant. What makes congressional
experts players in the policy world is the fact that they have an independent
base of power, rooted in independent access to knowledge, independent access
to their own electorates, experience, and the expectation in Washington that all
of these factors are mostly beyond the direct control of others. If the date of
members' departure from the scene is fixed and known, the way the other
players treat them changes, and, from the standpoint of members' influence,
greatly for the worse.
What term limits attack is not the constitutional right of Congress to make
judgments but rather the capacity of the institution-and by this I mean elected
members, as they organize themselves into caucuses and committees-to make
well-informed and independent judgments. Congress can always hire experts,
and increasingly it does. Some of these experts hang around Capitol Hill for
a generation, and become genuinely devoted to the institution. Most cycle in
and out of congressional employ more rapidly, and keep Congress in touch
with points of view drawn from their professional training.36 Term limits
empower these people at the expense of members.37 So, too, do they increase
the power of bureaucrats, lobbyists, and executive branch politicos and their
entourages. And newspaper columnists. With the notable exception of
executive branch political appointees, who do not, on average, last very long,
all of these classes of Washington actors reap the benefits of experience on the
job. In addition, they may also have specialized training highly relevant to the
mastery of subject matter. On the whole, members of Congress do not possess
such training. Acquiring on-the-job experience is the only way open to them
if they intend to participate knowledgeably and independently in policy
making. Will, protesting all the while his friendship for Congress, advocates
the drastic attenuation of the principal means through which Congress
maintains its independence in the policy-making process.
Is there a more general public interest in Congress having an independent
capacity to influence public policy? Most legislatures in democratic nations,
after all, do not. In this respect Congress is nearly unique in the world today,
35. P. 59 ("If you accept the premise that government is like neurosurgery, only more so, what do the
rest of us have to say to these wizards once we are given 'access' and ushered into their presence?").
36. P. 57.
37. It may be argued that they have plenty of power already. See MICHAEL J. MALBIN, UNELECTED
REPRESENTATIVES (1980).
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and in world history.38 A separation of powers system that works, as ours
does, spreads power very widely. This is arguably appropriate in a continent-
wide nation as diverse and as large as the United States. The need for
members to seek votes and voter support in the course of Congressional
nominations, primary elections and general elections, the multitude of
ombudsman-like activities performed at the individual, retail level in each and
every congressional office, the mail-to members as well as from
members-all provide opportunities for ordinary citizens to gain access to their
government via members of Congress. Much of this access is available
whether members are new or old, but the fact that Congress, in aggregate, is
an influential body means a great deal in energizing federal bureaucracies to
be responsive to the concerns of members and their constituents. This might
lead to Keating Five scandals, to be sure. But hundreds of other legal,
appropriate, and helpful transactions must be put onto the other side of the
scale.
The existence of an independent deliberative capacity in Congress raises
the possibility of gridlock within the federal government, as different
preferences from time to time animate the coalitions dominating different
branches of government. And since Congress maintains a considerable
independent capacity to form and articulate views of public policy different
from the President, sometimes stalemates will result. This possibility was
entirely foreseen by the Framers, and is a necessary consequence of a system
of governmental checks and balances. Every two years Americans have an
opportunity to vote on this. Mostly, of course, they return incumbents to office,
as currently is their right under the Constitution.
It is also and simultaneously true that Congress is unpopular and
congressional term limits are popular. This is the testimony not only of public
opinion polls,39 but also what we can learn from the recent passage of
initiatives providing for congressional term limits in fifteen states.4 Of course
these initiatives raise constitutional questions, since by denying ballot access
to incumbents they may be construed as adding qualifications for congressional
service beyond the three (age, citizenship, residence) mentioned in the
Constitution.4' Congress is explicitly forbidden to add such qualifications,42
and courts will undoubtedly be asked whether state initiatives may do what has
been forbidden to Congress.
38. For an overview, see Nelson W. Polsby, "Legislatures," in 5 HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
257-319 (Fred I. Greenstein & Nelson W. Polsby eds., 1975).
39. Pp. 2-3, 189. See also polls summarized in Public Opinion Report: Term Limits, AM. ENTERPRISE,
Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 81, 89.
40. Thomas Galvin, Term Limits: Limits Score a Perfect 14 For 14 But Court Challenges Loom, 50
CONG. Q. WKLY. REP., November 7, 1992, at 3593. A similar initiative was passed two years earlier in
Colorado. Robert Pear, The 1990 Elections: Ballot Proposals, N.Y. TIMES, November 8, 1990, at Bl.
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
42. Powell v. McCormaek, 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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As it happens, Will does not discuss this constitutional issue.43 Moreover,
he rather trivializes the consideration of another issue of constitutional
dimension, namely the conditions under which one electorate can restrict the
choices available to future electorates. "If term limits are un-American because
they limit popular sovereignty," Will says, "then so, too, is the First
Amendment un-American." 44 Since current electorates, while voting for term
limits, also regularly and freely vote in large numbers for members of
Congress who have served for many terms, this problem does have some
reality.
If we are to resort to term limits as a way of intervening in all this, I
suppose the foremost obligation of those who would advise us in this matter
would be to cast all these considerations, somehow, into a balance, rather than
relying excessively upon horrible examples, so that we might see what the
social, political, and constitutional costs are of depriving one particular senior
member of the Senate Appropriations Committee of the power to feed federal
grants and transfer federal employees in large numbers from Bethesda to West
Virginia.' George Will has managed to write a book in which he gives little
or no serious consideration to such a balance. Most of what he has to say
about Congress consists of complaints about the venality, greed, and triviality
that can be observed there. What Congress gives us, he says, is "bad
government by the bushel." 6 This is an exaggeration, the sort of rhetoric he
piously deplores in others,47 but regularly indulges in himself. In fact, there
is much else to be observed in Congress, which he neglects. He fails to show
how term limits will change any of what he dislikes about Congress. It seems
to me highly probable that term limits would make many of these very things
much worse.
Will's goals of promoting disinterested deliberation, public-spirited
appropriations, and a more influential Congress are decent and greatly to be
applauded. His means for achieving them, term limits, won't do any of these
jobs.
43. He does, however, discuss, of all things, a balanced budget amendment. Pp. 190-99.
44. P. 122.
45. Pp. 29-31, 62.
46. P. 209.
47. Pp. 56-57.
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